Форум вопросов и ответов - С сегодняшнего дня я шл***ха.

mself, whether it is a number in a sense or not, will still be a numerical ratio of certain things and not a number proper, nor will it be a of number merely because it is a numerical ratio.
Again, from many numbers one number is produced, but how can one Form come from many Forms? And if the number comes not from the many numbers themselves but from the units in them, e.g. in 10,000, how is it with the units? If they are specifically alike, numerous absurdities will follow, and also if they are not alike (neither the units in one number being themselves like one another nor those in other numbers being all like to all); for in what will they differ, as they are without quality? This is not a plausible view, nor is it consistent with our thought on the matter.
Further, they must set up a second kind of number (with which arithmetic [Ссылки могут видеть только зарегистрированные пользователи. Зарегистрироваться...] deals), and all the objects which are called ‘intermediate’ by some thinkers; and how do these exist or from what principles do they proceed? Or why must they be intermediate between the things in this sensible world and the things-themselves?
Further, the units in must each come from a prior but this is impossible.
Further, why is a number, when taken all together, one?
Again, besides what has been said, if the units are diverse the Platonists should have spoken like those who say there are four, or two, elements; for each of these thinkers gives the name of element not to that which is common, e.g. to body, but to fire and earth, whether there is something common to them, viz. body, or not. But in fact [Ссылки могут видеть только зарегистрированные пользователи. Зарегистрироваться...] the Platonists speak as if the One were homogeneous like fire or water; and if this [Ссылки могут видеть только зарегистрированные пользователи. Зарегистрироваться...] is so, the numbers will not be substances. Evidently, if there is a One itself and this is a first principle, ‘one’ is being used in more than one sense; for otherwise the theory is impossible.
When we wish to reduce substances to their principles, we state that lines come from the short and long (i.e. from a kind of small and great), and the plane from the broad and narrow, and body from the deep and shallow. Yet how then can either the plane contain a line, or the solid a line or a plane? For the broad and narrow is [Ссылки могут видеть только зарегистрированные пользователи. Зарегистрироваться...] a different class from the deep and shallow. Therefore, just as number is not present in these, because the many and few are different from these, [Ссылки могут видеть только зарегистрированные пользователи. Зарегистрироваться...] evidently no other of the higher classes will be present [Ссылки могут видеть только зарегистрированные пользователи. Зарегистрироваться...] in the lower. But again the broad is not a genus [Ссылки могут видеть только зарегистрированные пользователи. Зарегистрироваться...] which includes the deep, for then the solid would have been a species of plane. Further, from what principle will the presence of the points in the line be derived? Plato even used to object to this class of things as being a geometrical fiction. He gave the name of principle of the line-and this he often posited-to the indivisible lines. Yet these must have a limit; therefore the argument from which the existence of the line follows proves also the existence of the point.
In general, though philosophy seeks the cause of perceptible things, we have given this up (for we say nothing of the cause from which change take